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Abstract. – The effects of propaganda are analyzed in an opinion dynamics model in which,
under certain conditions, individuals adjust their opinion as a result of random binary encoun-
ters. The aim of this paper is to study under what conditions propaganda changes the opinion
dynamics of a social system. Four different scenarios are found, characterized by different
sensitivities to the propaganda. For each scenario the maximum efficiency of propaganda is
attained following a given strategy that is here outlined.
Introduction. – The link between physics and sociology is historically profound. At the
end of the XVII century, when G. Galilei and I. Newton gave birth to classical physics, philoso-
phers proposed to apply similar deterministic laws to the broad fields of political and social
sciences [1–3]. This idea was further strengthened by the discovery of universal demographic
constants involving parameters strongly affected by individual free will or happenstance, such
as the number of weddings, crimes and deaths [4]. The philosopher A. Comte, then introduced
“social physics”, a foundation of modern sociology which studies social dynamics using deter-
ministic laws [5, 6]. As a typical social system is composed of a high number of individuals,
statistics is the key tool for a quantitative study. Opinion dynamics is one of the fields of
sociology that has interested physicists the most in the latest years. Opinion dynamics models
can be divided into two large classes. The first class is represented by models based on binary
opinions [7–11], in which social actors update their opinions as a result of social influence, of-
ten according to a kind of majority rule. The other class of opinion dynamics models considers
the opinion as a continuous variable [12–17]. In this paper we focus on the latter and inves-
tigate the effect of propaganda. Indeed, we consider a model where agents adjust continuous
opinions as a result of random binary encounters whenever their difference in opinion is below
a given threshold [17]. This model is here termed Continuous Opinions with Threshold (COT)
model and it is closely related to the “compromise model” studied in [18]. We are in particular
interested in analyzing under what conditions propaganda affects the dynamics of the group’s
opinion. Here, propaganda is a “message” that touches every individual at the same time.
The paper is organized as follows: first, we introduce the model and define the parameters
involved. Then we show the results of the numerical simulations and compare them with
dedicated analytical estimates. In conclusion, we will try to relate the mathematical results
to actual social systems.
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The model. – In our model, the system is formed by N individuals i. Each individual has
two characteristics. The first one is its opinion Oi. The opinion is the individual position on
a given subject. This picture could apply to many different fields such as politics, marketing,
religion, etc. The opinion Oi is represented by a number between 0 and 1 that symbolizes
the extremes: left and right in politics, atheism and faith in religion, etc. To each individual
i a second parameter σi between 0 and 1 is also associated, which can be interpreted as the
openness of mind or uncertainty about their own opinion. In this paper we study the case
where all the individuals have the same openness of mind, that is σi = σ, ∀i.
At each time step t, corresponding to sampling a pair of individuals, two random chosen
individuals meet: if their difference in opinion is smaller than the threshold σ, their opinion
tends to converge. Otherwise, their opinion remains unaltered. Mathematically
if |Oi(t)−Oj(t)| > σ ⇒ Oi(t+ 1) = Oi(t), Oj(t+ 1) = Oj(t),
if |Oi(t)−Oj(t)| < σ ⇒ Oi(t+ 1) = Oi(t) + µ[Oj(t)−Oi(t)],
Oj(t+ 1) = Oj(t) + µ[Oi(t)−Oj(t)],
where µ is the convergence parameter whose value may range from 0 to 1. It has been shown
that µ only influences the time needed for the system to go to equilibrium [17]. The dynamics
and behaviour of the system are not affected by this parameter. In this paper we then use
the fixed value µ = 0.5, which minimizes this transient. Within this framework, a master
equation for the distribution P (x, t), i.e. the fraction of agents that have opinions in the
range [x, x + dx] can be derived. This alternative formulation opens up the perspective of
implementing a very efficient numerical integration scheme [18].
The main result of the COT model is that, depending on the value σ, the process may
lead to a consensus among the individuals or to a fragmentation in nc clusters of opinions. It
has been found that nc ≈ Integer( 12σ ) [17, 18]. The smaller the σ, the more the population
will be divided in small groups sharing a common opinion, while for large σ the population
will reach a complete consensus with an agreement of all the individuals.
Notice that in the COT model only two individuals at a time can interact. We here propose
to enrich this picture by introducing an effective propaganda, modeled as an extended periodic
perturbation that interacts instantaneously with the whole population. This perturbation
can represent a political propaganda, the advertising of a product, a religious message of an
external subject who wants to convince the individuals to adhere to a particular constant
opinion Op. Therefore, in addition to the previous interactions, all the opinions are now
simultaneously confronted with the exterior opinion (Op) every T individual interactions, T
labeling the propaganda period. If the difference between the individual opinion Oi and the
propaganda opinion Op is smaller than σ, the individual opinion gets closer to the propaganda.
Otherwise it remains unchanged. Mathematically
if |Oi(t)−Op| > σ ⇒ Oi(t+ 1) = Oi(t),
if |Oi(t)−Op| < σ ⇒ Oi(t+ 1) = Oi(t) + µp[Op −Oi(t)],
where µp is the convergence parameter whose value may range from 0 to 0.5. In order to
quantify the effectiveness of propaganda, we define the propaganda efficiency (Ep) as the
percentage of individuals convinced, i.e. that share the same opinion of the propaganda when
the equilibrium is reached.
Results. – Before studying the effects of propaganda, let us provide an analytical esti-
mate of the characteristic relaxation time, hereafter termed Tc, associated to the COT-like
dynamics. Tc measures the time required for the system to converge to its asymptotic state.
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Fig. 1 – The relaxation time Tc as a function
N
2σ
ln(2σN). Symbols refer to numerical simulations
carried out for different values of σ, see the legend. As predicted by the proposed theory, a very good
linear correlation is observed. The numerical relaxation time is measured by performing the histogram
of the opinion distribution at every time step. The convergence is assumed to be reached when all
the bins are zero but one. The slope of the continuous curve depends on the chosen binning size.
Consider N ′ opinions uniformly distributed in a finite interval, whose length is smaller than
the threshold σ. At each iteration the number of distinct opinions is reduced by a factor 2,
because of the choice for µ. Hence, one needs approximately ln(N ′)/ ln(2) steps to attain
the final convergence state. Moreover, a multiplicative factor 1/σ has to be introduced to
properly account for the finite range of the interaction, σ being the probability that two ran-
domly chosen individuals have opinions closer than σ. In our case, nc ≈ Integer( 12σ ) clusters
develop, each of them being constituted by N ′ = 2Nσ elements. Therefore, combining the
above ingredients, one ends up with the following estimate for the convergence time Tc:
Tc ≈ N2σ
ln(2σN)
ln(2)
.
The functional dependence on N and σ is in agreement with the results of numerical simula-
tions, as clearly displayed in fig. 1.
Let us now turn to the COT model with propaganda. The simulations show that the
efficiency of the propaganda Ep depends on three parameters, the openness of mind σ, the
external opinion Op and propaganda period T , while keeping µp constant. In the following we
shall assume µp = µ = 0.5 and we observe that the qualitative results we obtain do not depend
on such a choice of parameters. In the plane (σ,Op), hereafter named phase diagram, we show
that we can define four different phases for the system, fig. 2. Each phase is characterized by
a different dependence of the efficiency Ep on the propaganda period T (1).
In the range σ ≥ ∣∣Op − 12
∣
∣+ 12 , zone I in fig. 2, the behaviours are trivial. We always obtain
a 100% efficiency Ep, no matter what the value of the propaganda opinion Op and period T are.
Indeed, in this range σ+Op ≥ 1, that means that propaganda acts directly on every individual.
(1)Notice that for different values of µp the system displays qualitatively analogous behaviours even though
a different partition of the phase diagram is observed.
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Fig. 2 Fig. 3
Fig. 2 – Phase diagram (σ, Op). Four different phase zones can be defined. Each zone is characterized
by a different dependence of the efficiency Ep on the propaganda period T . In zone I, σ > |Op −
0.5| + 0.5, Ep is always 100%, independently of the value of T . In zone II, max{0.28, |0.5 − Op|} <
σ < |0.5 − Op| + 0.5. Ep is 100% only if T > Tmin. Zones III, 0.28 < σ < 0.5 − Op, efficiency Ep is
100% only if Tmin < T < Tmax. Finally, in zone IV, propaganda has only a local effect; it can never
reach 100% efficiency.
Fig. 3 – Analysis of zone II. Left: the efficiency Ep as a function of the propaganda period T for
different values of Op in the case N = 200 and σ = 0.48. The open circles (◦), the diamonds () and
the triangles () represent, respectively, the case Op = 0.1, Op = 0.2 and Op = 0.3. Right: the value
of Tmin as a function of Op in the case N = 200 and σ = 0.48.
More interesting results are obtained in the range max(0.28,
∣
∣Op − 12
∣
∣) ≤ σ ≤ ∣∣Op − 12
∣
∣+ 12
of the phase diagram (σ,Op), zone II in fig. 2. Here, propaganda can obtain 100% efficiency,
that is, all the people have a final opinion equal to Op. In order to attain the maximum
efficiency, the propaganda period T must be larger than a minimum value Tmin which depends
on the individual open-mindedness σ, fig. 3 (right). In this range, it is more convenient to wait
for the system to begin converging before launching an external propaganda. If one imposes
a “too early” propaganda, the individuals with initial opinion close to Op quickly converge
together, while the individuals with extreme opposite opinion escape from the clustering and
drag a certain number of moderates to form an alternative extremist opposition group. This
opposition group has an opinion about the average between the moderate opinion 0.5 and the
extreme opposite of propaganda (|1−Op|), fig. 4. Indeed, the cluster centered around opinion
0.5, i.e. the cluster shown by the system in the absence of propaganda, is not a stable solution
anymore when a propaganda is imposed. Moderate individuals join one of the two extreme
clusters. The propaganda has the effect of extremising the system; indeed, in the presence
of propaganda, it always shows one (if T > Tmin) or two (if T < Tmin) opposite extreme
clusters. An upper bound estimate of Tmin can be derived showing that it scales linearly with
Op, the slope being proportional to Tc.
In the case of extreme propaganda (large or small Op) in a close-minded system (small σ),
100% efficiency Ep may be obtained if the propaganda period T is in between two values Tmin
and Tmax which depend on the value of σ, fig. 4. In these ranges, 0.28 < σ < |0.5−Op| zones III
in fig. 2, one must find the optimal balance between two opposite tendencies. On the one hand,
it is necessary to wait for the system to naturally converge to a moderate opinion, so that the
individuals with opposite extreme opinion with respect to Op come closer to the propaganda.
On the other hand, one should prevent the system from letting too many individuals converge
to a moderate opinion that falls out of the basin of attraction of the propaganda. Hence Tc
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Fig. 4 – Analysis of zones III. In all the subfigures N = 200 and Op = 0.1. a) The efficiency Ep as
a function of the propaganda period T for different values of σ. The open squares () represent the
case σ = 0.4, and the triangles () the case σ = 0.38. Note that Tmax gets smaller for increased
value of σ. The ansatz Tmax ∼ Tc proposed in the text gets the correct order of magnitude for Tmax
and the observed dependence on σ. b) The opinion of the N individuals as a function of time in
the case σ = 0.4 and T = 200 < Tmin. b1) The final (i.e. stable) distribution of the opinion of the
N individuals. c) The opinion of the N individuals as a function of time in the case σ = 0.4, and
T = 2700 > Tmax. c1) The final (i.e. stable) distribution of the opinion of the N individuals. d) The
opinion of the N individuals as a function of time in the case Tmin < T = 1150 < Tmax, and σ = 0.4.
d1) The final (i.e. stable) distribution of the opinion of the N individuals.
provides a good estimate for Tmax. It is interesting to notice that if T < Tmin, as in the
zone-II case, the system gives birth to a natural opposition to the propaganda, i.e. a stable
cluster at, roughly, the average between the moderate opinion 0.5 and the extreme opposite of
propaganda (|1−Op|), fig. 4b. In contrast, if T > Tmin the system shows two stable clusters,
one at Op and another very close to 0.5. Indeed, there is no extreme opposition created.
This is because the efficiency decreases very fast for T > Tmax. Remarkably, propaganda can
obtain 100% efficiency only with the collaboration of some individuals of the system. Indeed,
if Tmin < T < Tmax the individuals with a moderate initial opinion bring the extremists to a
more moderate position, thus making them vulnerable to the propaganda.
In the σ range in which the system spontaneously converges to several stable clusters
(σ < 0.28), we find that the efficiency Ep has a linear correlation with σ and is independent of
Op and T . In this range, zone IV in fig. 2, there is no difference between radical (close to the
extremes 0 and 1) and moderate (close to 0.5) opinions and between obsessive (small T ) and
non-obsessive (large T ) propaganda. Here, propaganda produces only local effects because it
is able to act only on individuals that have an initial opinion close to Op. Indeed, the global
dynamics of the system is not affected by the propaganda. Only a small variation of a cluster
opinion or the merging of two consecutive clusters at very low σ can be observed.
Conclusions. – In order to attain the maximum efficiency for a given propaganda Op, the
optimal range of propaganda period T depends on the characteristic of the system, i.e. the
open-mindedness σ. Besides the case of zone I, which is quite unrealistic because of the overly
large open-mindedness (σ > 0.5), one can focus on the other domains in the (σ,Op)-plane
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Fig. 5 – Analysis of zones IV. Subfigures show the opinion of the N = 200 individuals as a function of
time. The numbers on the right-hand side of the plot correspond to the fraction of individuals present
in the cluster at the end of the simulation. a) Case σ = 0.24, no propaganda is imposed. b) σ = 0.24,
Op = 0.2 and T = 100. c) σ = 0.1 with no propaganda imposed. d) σ = 0.1, Op = 0.2 and T = 100.
(zones II, III and IV) and relate our mathematical model to actual social systems.
Zones II and III can be compared to a mathematical population that has a single final
cluster. In the real world, this social system could mimic a group of people associated to some
kind of similar belief: people belonging to the same religion, political party, trade union, etc.
In these (σ, Op) regions, we found that propaganda can have 100% efficiency if T > Tmin
and if Tmin < T < Tmax, respectively, for zone II and zones III. This mechanism can also be
found in the real-world behaviour. For example, when a leader aims at a moderate redirection
of the political line of its own party, he has to act gradually [19–21], i.e. T > Tmin as found
in zone II.
On the other hand, if a leader wants to give a very extremist (very conservative or pro-
gressist) change to the group, the strategy must be set in order to both give time to people to
accept the new course and to avoid the formation of consensus of the opposite extreme opin-
ion. This corresponds to the case of zone III, where Tmin < T < Tmax in order to have 100%
consensus. The above consideration relies on the working assumption that parties initially
have uniform distribution of opinions. This ansatz is supposedly correct when new issues
arise, which often happens in modern societies, e.g. abortion, immigration, etc.
It is also interesting to notice that in zones II and III, obsessive propaganda (T < Tmin)
always gives birth to an opposite extreme cluster. Individuals leave their moderate opinion to
join either the extremist opinion or the naturally created opposition. We believe that in the
real world this is the well-known over-exposure effect [22]. Public people (or products) do not
over-expose themselves in order to prevent an opposite reaction from the audience.
Zone IV of the (σ, Op)-plane is maybe the most easily related to a real population. Indeed,
100% consensus is never reached. In this region one can distinguish between two cases. The
case where 2 stable clusters (nc = 2) arise and the one which leads to several organized
groups, fig. 5. In the real world this setting could represent, respectively, a country with
a bipolar political system (USA, UK) and countries with a multiparty configuration (Italy,
France, etc.) [23]. In a multicluster configuration, the model shows that propaganda can, at
maximum, create consensus between people with initial opinion close to the propaganda Op,
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fig. 5. In the bipolar configuration, our model predicts that people belonging to one side can
be reached by an opposite propaganda. This could be interpreted as the fact that in a bipolar
system it always happens that some people switch from one side to the other [24], thus making
alternance possible. It occurs to many people in the USA to have voted both republican and
democratic (or conservative and labor in UK) during their life. It is much less likely to happen
that someone votes both a right and a left party in a multiparty country [25]. People usually
switch between parties belonging to the same political side.
In conclusion, we showed that the COT opinion model with propaganda is a good candidate
as a framework to study real social systems. In particular, it would be interesting to further
investigate zone IV of the (σ, Op)-plane. It would also be interesting to expand the model by
introducing other parameters such as two (or more) competitive propaganda and assigning
to the population a more realistic open-mindedness distribution. This would turn the model
into a more adapted tool to study real population behaviours.
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